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1. IntroductionRegulatory convergence and the elimination of currency risk1 are two of the reasons behind 
the significant increase in cross-border finan-cial activity in the euro area since the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century (see Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2009 and Barnes et al., 2010). This effect has been even stronger in some of the EMU peripheral countries.2 However, although 
cross-border banking clearly benefits risk di-
versification in businesses’ portfolios and is considered by monetary authorities as a hall-
mark of successful financial integration, it also presents some drawbacks. First, foreign capital is likely to be much more mobile than domestic capital; in a crisis situation, foreign banks may simply decide to “cut and run”. Mo-
reover, in an integrated banking system, finan-cial or sovereign crises in a country can quickly spill over into other countries. Indeed, given the high degree of interconnectedness in Euro-
1 The introduction of the Single Banking License in 1989 through the Second Banking Directive was a 
decisive step towards a unified European financial market, which subsequently led to a convergence in 
financial legislation and regulation across member countries.2 In particular, the sources of external financing for Portuguese and Greek banks radically shifted on joining the euro; traditionally reliant on dollar debt, their banks were subsequently able to raise funds 
from their counterparts elsewhere in the EMU (See Spiegel, 2009a and 2009b)
pean financial markets, a major fear was that the default of the sovereign/banking sector in one EMU country could have spillover effects that might result in subsequent defaults in the 
euro area as a whole (see Schoenmaker and Wagner, 2013)3.In this context, an important reason and jus-
tification for providing financial support to Greece in May 2010 was precisely the “fear” 
of contagion (see, for instance, Constâncio, 2012), not only because there was a sudden 
loss of confidence among investors, who tur-ned their attention to the macroeconomic and 
fiscal imbalances within EMU countries which 
had largely been ignored until then (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013), but also because seve-ral European Union banks had a particularly 
high exposure to Greece (see Gómez-Puig and 
Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013).Indeed, from late 2009 onwards, the demand for the German bund grew due its safe haven status, and yield spreads of euro area issues 
with respect to Germany spiralled (see Figure 1). Besides, since May 2010, not only has Gree-ce been rescued twice, but Ireland, Portugal 
and Cyprus also needed bailouts to stay afloat.
3 Theoretical research modelling various aspects of 
the costs and benefits of cross-border banking (e.g. Dasgupta 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner 2004;Wag-ner 2010) concludes that some degree of integra-
tion is beneficial but that an excessive degree may not be.
Figure 1: Daily 10-year sovereign yields in EMU countries and rolling total connectedness
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In this scenario, where we have seen how cri-sis episodes in a given EMU sovereign market affect other markets almost instantaneously, some important questions have emerged that economists, policymakers, and practitioners need to address urgently. To what extent was the sovereign risk premium increase in the euro area during the European sovereign debt crisis due only to deteriorated debt sustainabi-
lity in member countries? Did markets’ degree 
of connectedness play any significant role in this increase? Researchers have already studied transmis-sion and/or contagion between sovereigns in the euro area context using a variety of 
methodologies (correlation-based measures, 
conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR), or Granger-causality approach, among others)4: Kalbaska 
and Gatkowski (2012), Metiu (2012), Caporin 
et al. (2013), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), 
Gorea and Radev (2014), Gómez-Puig and Sos-
villa-Rivero (2014) or Ludwig (2014) to name a few.Nevertheless, in this paper we will focus on the interconnection between EMU sovere-ign debt markets by applying a methodology which has not been widely used in this area. 
Specifically, we will make use of Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2014)’s measures of connectedness 
(both system-wide and pair-wise) in order to contribute to the literature on international transmission mechanisms that the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has rekindled, and to be able to answer some of the previously po-sed questions.This literature includes two groups of theories which, though not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive (see Dungey and Gajurel, 2013), have fos-tered considerable debate. On the one hand, since fundamentals of different countries may 
be interconnected by their cross-border flows of goods, services, and capital, or common shocks may adversely affect several economies simultaneously, transmission between coun-tries may occur. These effects are known in the 
literature as “spillovers” (Masson, 1999), “in-
terdependence” (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), 
4 See Biblio et al. (2012) for a review of the mea-sures proposed in the literature to estimate those linkages.
or “fundamentals-based contagion” (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 2000). On the other hand, finan-cial crises in one country may conceivably tri-gger crises elsewhere for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals – perhaps because they lead to shifts in market senti-ment, change the interpretation given to exis-ting information, or trigger herding behaviour. This transmission mechanism is known in the 
literature as “pure contagion” (Masson, 1999). In this context, the measures of connectedness 
proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) can be considered as a bridge between the two vi-sions mentioned above, since they examine vo-latility spillovers using useful information on 
agents’ expectations5, and sidestep the conten-
tious issues associated with the definition and 
existence of episodes of “fundamentals-based” or “pure” contagion.A substantial amount of literature uses diffe-
rent extensions of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012)’s previous methodology to examine spillovers and transmission effects in stock, foreign 
exchange, or oil markets in non-EMU coun-tries. Awartania et al. (2013), Lee and Chang 
(2013), Chau and Deesomsak (2014) and Cro-
nin (2014) apply this methodology to exami-
ne spillovers in the United States’ markets; 
Yilmaz (2010), Zhou et al. (2012) or Narayan 
et al. (2014) focus on Asian countries; Apos-
tolakisa and Papadopoulos (2014) and Tsai 
(2014) examine G-7 economies, and Duncan 
and Kabundi (2013) centre their analysis on South African markets. However, few papers to date have looked at the connectedness and spi-llover effects within euro area sovereign debt markets, even though quantifying the spillover risk is a very important tool in order to assess 
whether the benefits of a sovereign bailout may outweigh its costs.
Some exceptions are Antonakakis and Vergos 
(2013), who examined spillovers between 10 euro area government yield spreads during 
the period 2007-2012; Claeys and Vašicek 
(2014), who examined linkages between 16 European sovereign bond spreads during the 
5 Since uncertainty is based on how much of the forecasting error variance cannot be explained by shocks in the variable, expectations gauge the evo-lution of both fundamental and market sentiment variables.
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period 2000-2012; Glover and Richards-Shu-
bik (2014), who applied a model based on the 
literature on contagion in financial networks to data on sovereign credit default swap spreads 
(CDS) among 13 European sovereigns from 
2005 to 2011; and Alter and Beyer (2014), who quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and banks in the euro area. While the above authors apply Diebold and 
Yilmaz’s methodology, Favero (2013) propo-
ses an extension to Global Vector Autoregressi-
ve (GVAR) models to capture time-varying in-terdependence between EMU sovereign yield spreads.However, to our knowledge, no empirical analyses have been performed of the connec-
tedness in sovereigns’ market volatility, in spite of its profound importance. As volatility 
reflects the extent to which the market evalua-tes and assimilates the arrival of new informa-tion, the analysis of its pattern of transmission may provide insights into the characteristics and dynamics of sovereign debt markets. This information might help to obtain a better un-derstanding of yield evolution over time, pro-viding a barometer for the vulnerability of the-se markets.Moreover, since volatility tracks investor fear, by measuring and analyzing the dynamic con-nectedness in volatility we are able to examine the “fear of connectedness” expressed by mar-ket participants as they trade. So, given that 
volatility tracks investors’ perceived risk and 
is a crisis-sensitive variable which can induce 
“volatility surprise” (Engle 1993), this paper centres on the analysis of connectedness in EMU sovereign debt market volatility using 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014)’s methodology in 
order to fill the existing gap in the literature.
Moreover, Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) showed that the connectedness framework was closely 
linked with both modern network theory (see 
Glover and Richards-Shubik, 2014) and mo-
dern measures of systemic risk (see Ang and Longstaff, 2013 or Acemoglu et al., 2014). The degree of connectedness, on the other hand, measures the contribution of individual units to systemic network events, in a fashion very 
similar to the CoVaR of this unit (see, e. g., Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008).
This paper explores this challenging avenue of research, focusing our study on connected-ness in EMU sovereign bond market volatility during the period from April 1999 to January 2014. However, unlike previous studies, in the analysis we will only include euro area coun-
tries and work with 10-year yields instead of spreads over the German bund, in order to be able to include Germany in the study. After explaining the methodology that will be used in the empirical analysis, we will proceed in four stages. First, in order to estimate sys-
tem-wide connectedness, we will undertake 
a full-sample (static analysis) that is not only of intrinsic interest, but will also prepare the way for the second stage: the performance of 
a dynamic (rolling-sample) analysis of condi-tional connectedness. In the third stage, we will “zoom in” on the evolution of net directio-nal connectedness in each market and assess whether their determinants differ between EMU central and peripheral countries. Finally, 
in the last stage we will examine how net pair-wise connectedness changes over the sample period. Overall, our results suggest that the positive 
influence exerted by economically sound core countries over peripheral ones in the stability period suddenly vanished with the outbreak of the crisis, when investors disavowed the shel-
ter that peripheral countries could find in  cen-tral countries and turned their attention to the 
major imbalances that they presented. Conse-quently, during the period of stability, beside 
the slight differences in yield behaviour (all fo-llowed the evolution of the German bund, and spreads moved in a very narrow range) it was the central countries that triggered net con-nectedness relationships; in the crisis period, however, there was a major shift and this role was now played by peripheral countries. The-refore, according to our results, in a context of 
increased cross-border financial activity in the 
euro-area, the concern that in turbulent times a shock in one country might have spillover effects into others may be well founded, and 
global financial stability may be threatened.The rest of the paper is organized as fo-
llows. Section 2 presents Diebold and Yılmaz 
(2014)’s methodology for assessing connec-
9
tedness in financial market volatility, and the 
empirical results (both static and dynamic) obtained for our sample of EMU sovereign 
markets (a system-wide measure of connec-tedness). In Section 3 we present the empiri-cal results regarding the evolution of net di-rectional connectedness in each market, and explore its  determinants. Section 4 examines 
the time-varying behaviour of net pair-wise directional connectedness at different stages 
of the current financial crisis. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes the findings and offers some con-cluding remarks.
2. Connectedness analysis.
2.1. Econometric methodology.The main tool for measuring the amount of connectedness is based on a decomposition of the forecast error variance, which we will now 
briefly describe.Given a multivariate empirical time series, the forecast error variance decomposition results from the following steps:
1. Fit a standard vector autoregressive (VAR) model to the series.2. Using series data up to and including time 
t, establish an H period-ahead forecast (up to time t + H).3. Decompose the error variance of the fore-cast for each component with respect to shocks from the same or other components at time t.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) propose several connectedness measures built from pieces of variance decompositions in which the forecast error variance of variable i is decomposed into parts attributed to the various variables in the system. This section provides a summary of their connectedness index methodology.Let us denote by dHij the ij-th H-step variance 
decomposition component (i.e., the fraction of variable i’s H-step forecast error variance due to shocks in variable j). The connected-
ness measures are based on the “non-own”, or “cross”, variance decompositions, dHij, i, j = 1, . 
. . , N, i ≠ j.
Consider an N-dimensional covariance-
stationary data-generating process (DGP) with orthogonal shocks: ,)( tt uLx Θ=  
...,)( 2210 +Θ+Θ+Θ=Θ LLL  .),( IuuE tt =′Note that 0Θ  need not be diagonal. All aspects of connectedness are contained in this very 
general representation. Contemporaneous aspects of connectedness are summarized in 
0Θ  and dynamic aspects in ,...}.,{ 21 ΘΘ  Trans-formation of  ,...},{ 21 ΘΘ  via variance decom-positions is needed to reveal and compactly summarize connectedness. Diebold and Yil-
maz (2014) propose a connectedness table such as Table 1 to understand the various con-nectedness measures and their relationships. 
Its main upper-left NxN block, which contains the variance decompositions, is called the “va-riance decomposition matrix,” and is denoted by   ].[ ijH dD =  The connectedness table increases  HD  with a rightmost column con-taining row sums, a bottom row containing co-
lumn sums, and a bottom-right element con-taining the grand average, in all cases for i ≠ j.
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The off-diagonal entries of HD  are the parts of the N forecast-error variance decompositions of relevance from a connectedness perspecti-ve. In particular, the gross pair-wise directional 
connectedness from j to i is defined as follows:
.Hij
H
ji dC =← Since in general ,H ijH ji CC ←← ≠   the net pair-wise 
directional connectedness from j to i, can be de-
fined as:
 .H ji
H
ij
H
ij CCC ←← −=
As for the off-diagonal row sums in Table 1, they give the share of the H-step forecast-error variance of variable xi coming from 
shocks arising in other variables (all others, 
as opposed to a single other), while the off-diagonal column sums provide the share of the H-step forecast-error variance of variable 
xi going to shocks arising in other variables. 
Hence, the off-diagonal row and column sums, labelled “from” and “to” in the connectedness table, offer the total directional connectedness measures. In particular, total directional connectedness from others to i is defined as
,
1
∑
≠
=
•← =
N
ij
j
H
ij
H
i dC
and total directional connectedness to others from i is defined as
  ,
1
∑
≠
=
•← =
N
ij
j
H
ij
H
i dC
We can also define net total directional connec-tedness as
.•←•← −=
H
i
H
i
H
i CCC
Finally, the grand total of the off-diagonal entries in DH (equivalently, the sum of the“from” column or “to” row) measures total 
connectedness:
.1
1,
∑
≠
=
=
N
ij
ji
H
ij
H d
N
C
For the case of non-orthogonal shocks, the variance decompositions are not as easily calculated as before, because the variance of a weighted sum is not an appropriate sum of variances; in this case, methodologies for providing orthogonal innovations like 
traditional Cholesky-factor identification may be sensitive to ordering. So, following 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), a generalized 
VAR decomposition (GVD), invariant to 
Table 1: Schematic connectedness table
x1 x2 ... xN Connectedness from others
x1  Hd12
...  H
Nd1 1,1 1 ≠∑ = jd
N
j
H
j
x2  Hd 21  Hd 22
...  H
Nd 2 2,1 2 ≠∑ = jd
N
j
H
j
- .
- .
- .
xN  H
Nd 1  
H
Nd 2
...  H
NNd Njd
N
j
H
Nj ≠∑ = ,1
Connectedness 
to others ∑=
N
i
H
id1 1 ∑ =
N
i
H
id1 2
...... ∑ =Ni HiNd1
 Hd11
1≠i 2≠i Ni ≠ Ni ≠
∑ =
N
ji
H
iNdN 1,
1
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necessary: 
1
g
ijg
ij N
g
ij
j
d
d
d
=
=
∑
   , where by construction 
1
1
N
g
ij
j
d
=
=∑   and  
, 1
N
g
ij
i j
d N
=
=∑ 
.
The matrix g gijD d =     permits us to define 
similar concepts as defined before for the orthogonal case, that is, total directional connectedness, net total directional 
connectedness, and total connectedness.
2.2. Data
We use daily data of 10-year bond yield volati-lity built on data collected from the Thomson Reuters Datastream for eleven EMU countries: 
both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Table 2: Full-sample connectednessGER FRA ITA SPA NET BEL AUS GRE FIN POR IRE Contribu-
tion From 
OthersGER 20.05 18.39 2.83 1.34 17.09 9.79 13.04 0.08 17.20 0.07 0.12 79.95FRA 10.38 29.44 1.10 0.29 14.93 13.11 15.48 0.41 14.71 0.09 0.07 70.56ITA 0.52 0.36 68.00 25.27 0.67 3.08 0.30 0.00 0.76 0.13 0.90 32.00SPA 0.22 0.03 34.03 61.69 0.20 1.69 0.08 0.08 0.34 0.38 1.26 38.31NET 12.24 18.85 2.74 0.50 20.64 12.72 14.75 0.01 17.38 0.16 0.02 79.36BEL 4.89 10.26 12.36 4.91 8.97 41.10 8.48 0.34 8.41 0.10 0.16 58.90AUS 9.13 20.03 1.06 0.19 15.11 14.00 23.83 0.55 15.93 0.16 0.01 76.17GRE 0.10 0.23 2.89 2.13 0.10 0.12 0.01 92.66 0.03 1.05 0.67 7.34FIN 12.09 18.65 3.23 1.04 17.09 11.55 15.74 0.10 20.39 0.09 0.03 79.61POR 0.01 0.37 10.13 13.34 0.04 0.04 0.36 10.44 0.04 54.45 10.80 45.55IRE 0.07 0.36 8.28 10.23 0.00 1.02 0.12 2.70 0.01 6.04 71.18 28.82
Contribu-
tion
To Others
71.23 74.83 53.63 48.99 78.24 62.02 74.15 13.69 78.58 13.17 16.48 54.23
Net Contri-
bution
(To –From) 
Others
-8.72 4.27 21.63 10.68 -1.12 3.13 -2.02 6.34 -1.03 -2.37 -2.34
Note: GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively.
ordering, proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) will be used. The 
H-step generalized variance decomposition 
matrix is defined as 
gH gH
ijD d =   , where 
( )
( )
1 21
0
1
0
´
´ ´
H
jj i h j
gH h
ij H
i h h j
h
e e
d
e e
σ
−
−
=
−
=
Θ Σ
=
Θ ΣΘ
∑
∑
In this case, ej is a vector with jth element unity and zeros elsewhere, hΘ  is the coefficient matrix 
in the infinite moving-average representation 
from VAR, Σ   is the covariance matrix of the 
shock vector in the non-orthogonalized-VAR, 
jjσ  being its jth diagonal element. In this GVD framework, the lack of orthogonality means that the rows of gHijd  do not have sum unity and, in order to obtain a generalized connectedness index g gijD d =   , the following normalization is 
12
Spain). Our sample begins on 1 April 1999 and 
ends on 27 January 2014 (i.e., a total of 3,868 observations)6, spanning several important fi-nancial market episodes in addition to the cri-
sis of 2007-2008 – in particular, the euro area sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards.
2.3. Static (full-sample, unconditional) 
analysis
The full-sample connectedness table appears as Table 2. As mentioned above, the ijth entry of 
the upper-left 11x11 country submatrix gives 
the estimated ijth pair-wise directional con-nectedness contribution to the forecast error 
variance of country i’s volatility yields coming 
from innovations to country j. Hence, the off-
diagonal column sums (labelled TO) and row 
sums (labelled FROM) gives the total directio-nal connectedness to all others from i and from 
all others to i respectively. The bottom-most 
row (labelled NET) gives the difference in total 
directional connectedness (to-from). Finally, 
the bottom-right element (in boldface) is total connectedness.
As can be seen, the diagonal elements (own connectedness es) are the largest individual elements in the table, but total directional con-
nectedness (from others or to others) tends to be much larger, except for the EMU peripheral countries. In addition, the spread of the “from” degree distribution is noticeably greater than that of the “to” degree distribution for six out of the eleven cases under study.
Regarding pair-wise directional connected-
ness (the off-diagonal elements of the upper-left 11 × 11 submatrix), the highest observed 
pair-wise connectedness is from Italy to Spain 
(34.03%). In return, the pair-wise connec-
tedness from Spain to Italy (25.27%) is the 
second-highest. The highest value of pair-wi-se directional connectedness between EMU central countries is from France to Austria 
(20.03%), followed by that from France to the 
Netherlands (18.85%). The total directional connectedness from others, which measures the share of volatility shocks received from other bond yields in the total variance of the forecast error for each bond yield, ranges bet-
6 The sample starts in April 1999 since data for Greece are only available from that date onwards.
ween 7.34% (Greece) and 79.95% (Germany). As for the total directional connectedness to others, our results suggest that it varies from 
a low of 13.17% for Greece to 78.58% for Fin-
land: a range of 65.41 points for connected-
ness to others, lower than the range of 72.61 points found for connectedness from others. 
Finally, we obtain a value of 54.23% for the total connectedness between the eleven coun-
tries under study for the full sample (system-
wide measure) – significantly lower than the 
value of 78.3% obtained by Diebold and Yil-
maz (2014) for US financial institutions, or the 
97.2% found by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) for 
international financial markets.
2.4 Dynamic (rolling, conditional) 
analysis
The full-sample connectedness analysis pro-vides a good characterization of “unconditio-nal” aspects of the connectedness measures. However, it does not help us to understand the connectedness dynamics. The appeal of connectedness methodology lies in its use as a measure of how quickly return or vola-tility shocks spread across countries as well as within a country. This section presents an analysis of dynamic connectedness which re-lies on rolling estimation windows.The dynamic connectedness analysis starts with total connectedness, and then moves on to net directional connectedness across coun-tries in Section 3.2.4.1. Total connectednessIn Figures 1 to 3 we plot total volatility connec-
tedness over 200-day rolling-sample windows and using 10 days as the predictive horizon for the underlying variance decomposition. In Fi-gure 1 the rolling total connectedness is plot-
ted along with the evolution of daily 10-year sovereign yields, while in Figures 2 and 3 it is plotted separately. In Figure 1, we can identify two distinct pe-riods in the evolution of the total level of con-nectedness, which coincide with the evolution 
of 10-year yields. In the first period (which we will term the “stability period”), the level 
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of connectedness of the EMU sovereign debt market is high, matching the close evolution 
of 10-year yields (the spreads moved in a na-rrow range and reached values close to zero). 
Neither the US subprime crisis of August 2007 
nor the Lehman Brothers Collapse of Septem-ber 2008 seemed to have a substantial effect on, euro area sovereign debt markets and their high level of connectedness. 
However, in April 2009, coinciding with a sta-
tement by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
expressing its fears of a slowdown in financial market integration, and only some months 
before Papandreou’s government announced 
Greece’s distressed debt position (November 2009)7, sovereign yields begin to spiral and total connectedness began a downturn trend. From then on, in parallel with the increase in sovereign yields, connectedness decreased and entered a different regime. These results 
are in concordance with Gómez-Puig and 
Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) who, by applying the Quandt–Andrews and Bai and Perron tests 
7 In November 2009, Papandreou’s government 
disclosed that its financial situation was far wor-se than it had previously announced, with a yearly 
deficit of 12.7% of GDP – four times more than the 
euro area’s limit,  and more than double the pre-
viously published figure – and a public debt of $410 billion. We should recall that this announcement only served to worsen the severe crisis in the Greek 
economy; the country’s debt rating was lowered to 
BBB+ (the lowest in the euro zone) on 8 December. These episodes marked the beginning of the euro 
area’s sovereign debt crisis.
(1998, 2003), allowed the data to select when regime shifts occur in each potential causal re-
lationship. Their results suggest that 69 out of 
the 110 breakpoints (i.e., 63%) occurred after 
November 2009, after Papandreou’s govern-
ment had revealed that its finances were far worse than previously announced. Moreover, the existence of two different regi-mes in the evolution of connectedness8 and the abrupt decrease in the mean in the second 
regime may explain the low value (54.23%) 
obtained for the total connectedness (system-wide measure) between the eleven countries studied over the full period. Therefore, sin-ce the second regime coincides with the euro area sovereign debt crisis, we will focus our 
analysis on this period (denoted as the crisis period and spanning from April 2009 to Ja-
nuary 2014) which has been split into five sub-periods. 
8 Formal mean and volatility tests (not shown here to save space, but available from the authors upon request) strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality in mean and variance before and after 
6 April 2009.
Figure 2: Rolling total connectedness throughout the period (1/13/2000-1/27/2014)
14
The first sub-period (a), which spans from 
June 2009 until 23 April  2010 (when Greece 
requested financial support), can still be defi-
ned as a pre-crisis period, since the downtrend in the total level of connectedness in euro area sovereign debt markets is suddenly reversed. 
However, during sub-periods (b) and (c) this 
downtrend deepens. Indeed, sub-period (b) – from April 2010 to August 2011 – was a time of real turbulence in EMU sovereign debt mar-kets: rescue packages were put in place not 
only in Greece (May 2010), but also in Ireland 
(November 2010) and Portugal (April 2011), 
and at the end of it (August 2011) the ECB an-nounced its second covered bond purchase program. As noted, the uncertainty continued 
in European debt markets during sub-period 
(c) (August 2011 - July 2012). During this pha-se, Italy was in the middle of a political crisis and the main rating agencies lowered the ra-tings not only of peripheral countries but of Austria and France as well. In this context of 
financial distress and huge liquidity problems, 
the ECB responded forcefully (along with other central banks) by implementing nonstandard monetary policies – that is, policies that went 
further than setting the refinancing rate. In 
particular, the ECB’s principal means of inter-
vention were the so-called long term refinan-
cing operations (LTRO) 9. In November 2011 
and March 2012, the ECB provided banks with 
a sum close to 500 billion Euros for a three-year period. However, in March 2012 the se-cond rescue package to Greece was approved, 
9 When the crisis struck, big central banks like the US Federal Reserve slashed their overnight inter-
est-rates in order to boost the economy. However, 
even cutting the rate as far as it could go (to al-most zero) failed to spark recovery. The Fed then began experimenting with other tools to encoura-ge banks to pump money into the economy. One of 
them was Quantitative Easing (QE). To carry out QE, central banks create money by buying securi-ties, such as government bonds, from banks, with electronic cash that did not exist before. The new money swells the size of bank reserves in the eco-nomy by the quantity of assets purchased—hence “quantitative” easing. In the euro area, the principal 
means of intervention adopted by the ECB was the LTRO, which differed notably from the QE policies of the Federal Reserve, in which the Fed purchased 
assets outright rather than helping to fund banks’ ability to purchase them. The LTRO is not the only 
non-standard monetary policy to have been imple-
mented by the ECB since the crisis. Other measu-res were the narrowing of the corridor, the change in eligibility criteria for collateral, interventions in the covered bonds market and, most importantly, 
the ECB’s launch of the security market program in 2010 involving interventions in the secondary so-vereign bond market. The latter program was dis-continued in 2011.
Figure 3: Rolling total connectedness after the breakpoint (6/4/2009-1/27/2014)
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Figure 4a: Net directional connectedness-EMU Central countries
Austria Belgium Finland
France Germany Netherlands
Figure 4b: Net directional connectedness- EMU Peripheral countries
Ireland Italy Greece
Portugal Spain
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and in June 2012 Spain requested financial as-sistance to recapitalize its banking sector. This 
was the backdrop to the ECB’s President Mario 
Draghi’s statement that he would do “whatever 
it takes to preserve the euro”. Sub-period (d), which starts after that statement in July 2012, 
clearly reflects the healing effects of Draghi’s words since a substantial increase in the level of total connectedness can be observed in EMU sovereign debt markets. Nonetheless, our in-
dicator definitely registered a new slowdown 
in March 2013, when Cyprus requested finan-
cial support. Therefore, the last sub-period (e) spans from that date to the end of the sample 
(January 2014).
3. Net directional connectednessThe net directional connectedness index provides information about how much each 
country’s sovereign bond yield volatility con-
tributes in net terms to other countries’ sove-reign bond yield volatilities and, like the full sample dynamic measure presented in the previous section, also relies on rolling estima-
tion windows. The time varying-indicators are displayed in Figures 4a and 4b for central and peripheral EMU countries respectively.Regarding the whole sample, it is noticeable that in three cases [the Netherlands and Fin-
land (see Figure 4a) along with Portugal (see 
Figure 4b)], more than 50% of the computed values are positive, indicating that during most of the sample period, their bond yield volatili-
ty influenced that of the rest of EMU countries, whereas for the remaining countries the oppo-
site is true (i.e., they are net receivers during most of the period). Interestingly, for Germany 
we obtain negative values in 84% of the sam-ple. When we split the sample into stability and crisis periods, a different picture emerges. Before the crisis, with the exception of Portu-gal, net triggers were mainly central countries, 
with a percentage of positive values of 85%, 
75%, 65%, 61% and 58% for the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Austria and France, respecti-
vely (see Figure 4a). However, during the crisis period, these countries became net receivers, 
with negative values of 100%, 99%, 98%, 95% 
and 92% for France, Finland, Belgium, Nether-lands and Austria respectively. In this second 
period, Germany also appears as a net receiver 
with a negative value of 100%. Regarding pe-
ripheral countries (Figure 4b), four of the five countries studied were net receivers during the stability period, with negative values of 
78%, 57%, 55% and 52% in the cases of Gree-ce, Ireland, Spain and Italy respectively; during the crisis period Greece and Portugal became 
net triggers, with positive values of 99% and 
52% respectively.
3.1 Determinants of net directional con-
nectedness3.1.1 Econometric methodologyAfter evaluating net directional connected-ness, we use panel model techniques to analy-se their determinants. We adopt an eclectic 
approach and apply a general-to-specific mo-delling strategy to empirically evaluate the re-levance of the highest number of variables that have been proposed in the recent theoretical and empirical literature as potential drivers of EMU sovereign bond yields.Since the potential determinants are available at monthly or quarterly frequency, we genera-te a new dependent variable by computing the monthly average of the daily net directional connectedness for each country.3.1.2. Instruments for modelling net direc-tional connectednessWe consider two groups of potential deter-minants of net directional connectedness: macroeconomic fundamental variables, and indicators of market sentiments. Regarding 
the macro-fundamentals, we use measures of 
the country’s fiscal position (the government 
debt-to-GDP and the government debt-to-GDP, DEB and DEF hereafter), the overall outstan-
ding volume of sovereign debt (which is con-sidered a good proxy of liquidity differences among markets, LIQ)10, the current-account-
10 Given the large size differences observed bet-
ween EMU peripheral sovereign debt markets (see 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013), it is likely that the overall outstanding volume of sovereign 
debt (which is considered a measure of market depth because larger markets may present lower information costs since their securities are likely 
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Table 4. Panel regression: Central countries
Without 
dummy
With dummy
Constant 1.9715*
(6.8140)
1.8426*
(6.1825)
DCRISIS -0.1288*
(-3.8916)
MacrofundamentalsINF -1.0207*
(4.2092)
-1.0624*
(3.9951)
DCRISIS*INF -0.0303*
(-3.7634)DEB -0.1357*
(-6.4410)
-0.1301*
(-6.4372)
DCRISIS*DEB -0.0066*
(-3.6941)
CAC 0.2327*
(3.7058)
0.2431*
(4.1258)
DCRISIS*CAC 0.0012*
(2.9584)
Market sentiments
CCI 0.2201*
(6.4104)
0.2139*
(6.4615)
DCRISIS*CCI 0.0053*
(3.7134)
EVOL -0.0068*
(-6.0229)
-0.0066*
(-5.7843)
DCRISIS*EVOL -0.0003*
(-4.1013)R2 Within Between Overall 0.57260.71460.4415 0.73940.73490.7472Observations 924Notes: FE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the 
corresponding z-statistics, computed using Whi-
te (1980)’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors. In the square brackets below the specifi-
cation tests are the associated p-values* indica-
tes significance at 1% level.
Table 3. Panel regression: All countries
Without 
dummy
With dummy
Constant 2.5705*
(3.8189)
2.8238*
(3.4237)
DCRISIS -0.7563*
(-4.2693)
MacrofundamentalsDEF -0.2132*
(-3.8710)
-0.2009*
(-3.4541)
DCRISIS*DEF -0.0056*
(-3. 2530)DEB -0.0146*
(-6.8134)
-0.0122*
(-5.4660)
DCRISIS*DEB -0.0041*
(-3.1127)
Market sentiments
CCI 0.3078*
(7.1324)
0.2809*
(7.1762)
DCRISIS*CCI 0.0079*
(5.7277)
EVOL -0.0085*
(-8.1645)
-0.0080*
(-8.3530)
DCRISIS*EVOL -0.0001*
(-4.3770)R2 0.8512 0.8497Observations 1694Notes: RE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding 
z-statistics, computed using White (1980)’s hete-
roskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square 
brackets below the specification tests are the asso-
ciated p-values. * indicates significance at 1% level.to trade frequently, and a relative large number of investors may own or may have analyzed their fea-tures) might be a good proxy of liquidity differen-ces between markets. Indeed, some of the literature suggests that market size is an important factor in the success of a debt market. Nevertheless, there is another reason to choose this variable: it might 
capture an additional benefit of large markets to 
the extent that the ‘‘too big to fail theory’’ (TFTF), taken from the banking system, might also hold in sovereign debt markets.
balance-to-GDP ratio (CAC) as a proxy of the foreign debt and the net position of the coun-try towards the rest of the world, and the Har-
monized Index of Consumer Prices monthly 
inter-annual rate of growth (as a measure of 
inflation, INF and the country’s loss of compe-titiveness). With respect to market sentiment 
proxies, we use the consumer confidence in-
dicator (CCI) to gauge economic agents’ per-
ceptions of future economic activity, and the monthly standard deviation of equity returns 
(EVOL) in each country to capture local stock market volatility11. A summary with the defi-nition and sources of all the explanatory varia-bles used is presented in Appendix A.
11 We would expect a positive relationship between 
the variables CAC, LIQ and CCI with net directional connectedness; whereas the relationship would be 
negative for the variables DEB, DEF, INF and EVOL.
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Table 5. Panel regression: Peripheral coun-
tries.
Without 
dummy
With dummy
Constant 11.4278*
(12.0155)
10.2377*
(10.3152)
DCRISIS -0.5198*
(-13.3843)
MacrofundamentalsDEF -0.4408*
(-3.8791)
-0.4130*
(-3.7687)
DCRISIS*DEF -0.0105*
(-3.7596)
Market sentiments
CCI 0.7817*
(12.3218)
0.8152*
(11.1011)
DCRISIS*CCI 0.0130*
(10.9831)
EVOL -0.0004*
(-8.2425)
-0.0005*
(-7.1149)
DCRISIS*EVOL -0.0002*
(-3.8954)R2 0.8572 0.8674Observations 780Notes: RE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the 
corresponding z-statistics, computed using Whi-
te (1980)’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors. In the square brackets below the specifi-
cation tests are the associated p-values. * indica-
tes significance at 1% level.3.1.3. Empirical resultsOur empirical analysis starts with a general unrestricted statistical model including all ex-planatory variables to capture the essential characteristics of the underlying dataset. We use standard testing procedures to reduce its complexity by eliminating statistically insig-
nificant variables. We check the validity of the reductions at each stage in order to ensure the 
congruence of the finally selected model and thus to identify the variables that best explain the developments.
Tables 3 to 5 show the final results for three groups of countries: all 11 EMU countries un-der study, EMU central countries, and EMU peripheral countries throughout the sam-
ple period: 2000:01-2014:01. The reason for 
splitting the sample into these two groups is 
that, based on a country-by-country analysis, it can be concluded that EMU countries under study are not homogeneous but comprise two categories. Therefore, this division12  makes it possible to differentiate the impact of potential determinants on bond spreads in core and pe-ripheral countries. We report only the results obtained using the relevant model in each 
case: the Random Effects (RE) model in the case of all EMU countries and peripheral EMU 
countries; and the Fixed Effects (FE) model for the central EMU countries.
The first column in these tables do not take into account the dynamic properties of net directional connectedness; they show the re-
sults for the whole period (pre-crisis and cri-sis) in order to select the best model for use in the rest of the analysis after having eliminated 
statistically insignificant variables. However, since we have previously detected a potential structural change in April 2009, we analyse 
the differences in the significance of the coe-
fficients over time (i.e., during the stability and the crisis periods).Therefore, in addition to the independent va-
riables chosen a dummy (DCRISIS), which 
takes the value 1 in the crisis period (and 0, otherwise) is also introduced in the estima-
tions, and the coefficients of the interactions between this dummy and the rest of variables 
are calculated (see Gómez-Puig, 2006 and 2008). Thus, the marginal effects of each varia-ble are:
β = β1 + β2DCRISIS
We honestly think that a formal coefficient test H0: β1 = β1 + β2, to assess whether the impact of independent variables on net directional 
connectedness changed significantly with the start of the sovereign debt crisis is unneces-
sary as long as β2 is significant. So the marginal 
coefficients of a variable are:
β = β1 (in the stability period)
β = β11+ β2 (in the crisis period)
12 This classification of EMU central and peripheral countries follows the standard division presented in the literature.
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The second column in Tables 3 to 5 shows the 
re-estimation results with the DCRISIS dummy. Looking across the columns in these tables we see that, when examining the variables measu-ring market sentiment in all eleven countries 
(Table 3) we find a negative and significant 
effect for the stock-market volatility (EVOL), 
whereas, as expected, the consumer confiden-
ce indicator (CCI) presents a positive sign. As 
for the local macro-fundamentals, our results suggest a negative impact on the net directio-nal connectedness of variables measuring the 
fiscal position (both the debt and the deficit-
to-GDP). Moreover, without exception, all mar-ginal effects register an increase in the crisis 
period compared to the pre-crisis one. This rise in the sensitivity to both fundamentals and market sentiment during the crisis period 
compared with the pre-crisis is in line with the 
previous empirical literature (see Gómez-Puig 
et al., 2014, among others).Our analysis also highlights the differences bet-ween the two groups of EMU countries, central and peripheral. In net directional connected-ness episodes triggered by peripheral coun-
tries, variables that gauge market participants’ perceptions seem to present a higher relevan-ce, while macroeconomic fundamentals seem to play a greater role in relationships where central countries are the triggers. In the lat-
ter case (see Table 4), three variables gauging 
macroeconomic fundamentals are significant 
with the expected sign (the loss of competiti-
veness (INF), the Government deficit-to-GDP 
(DEB) and the net position towards the rest 
of the word (CAC)); whilst in the former (see Table 5) only the variable that captures the go-
vernment deficit-to-GDP (DEF) turns out to be 
significant. With regard to the variables mea-
suring market sentiment, in the two sub-sam-
ples we find a negative and significant effect 
for stock-market volatility (EVOL), whereas, as 
expected, the consumer confidence indicator 
(CCI) presents a positive sign13 . Again, without exception, for the two groups of countries all marginal effects register an increase during 
the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period.Therefore, our results indicate that the crisis 13 The only variable that does not turn out to be sig-
nificant in any of the estimations is our proxy for the market liquidity.
had a significant impact on the markets’ reac-
tions to financial news, especially in the peri-pheral countries. In this respect, some authors 
have argued that the financial crisis might spread from one country to another due to market imperfection or the herding behaviour of international investors. A crisis in one cou-
ntry may give a “wake-up call” to international investors to reassess the risks in other coun-tries; uninformed or less informed investors 
may find it difficult to extract the signal from the falling price and follow the strategies of better informed investors, thus generating ex-
cess co-movements across the markets. The 
findings presented by Beirne and Fratscher 
(2013), for instance, also indicate that for some EMU countries such as peripheral cou-
ntries there is strong evidence of this “wake-up call” contagion, though for other countries there is much less evidence of this kind since the relevance of macroeconomic fundamentals is higher.
4. Net pair-wise directional con-
nectednessSo far, we have discussed the behaviour of the total connectedness and total net directional connectedness measures for eleven EMU so-vereign debt markets. However, we have also 
examined their net pair-wise directional con-nectedness. 
Specifically, Figure 5a displays net pair-wise directional connectedness during the two de-tected regimes, whilst Figure 5b presents the 
results obtained during the five sub-periods into which the crisis period has been divided. 
Both figures present very interesting results. Figure 5a shows that while in the stability pe-riod central countries are the triggers in the connectedness relationships, in the crisis regi-me, these relationships are stronger when the trigger is a peripheral country. These results corroborate those presented in Figure 4 where we plotted net dynamic directional connected-ness in both core and peripheral countries. In particular, in the stability period, connec-tedness relationships departing from central 
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Figure 5a: Net pair-wise directional connectedness before and after breakpoint
1/13/2000 to 4/5/2009 (before breakpoint) 4/6/2009 to 1/27/2014 (after breakpoint)
Notes: We show the most important directional connections among the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond 
yields under study. Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in grayscale) 
correspond to the tenth, twentieth and thirtieth percentiles of all net pair-wise directional connections. Node size indicates sovereign debt market size. GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively. 
Figure 5b: Net pair-wise directional connectedness during the five sub-periods after breakpoint
Sub-period (a): 4/6/2009 to 
4/22/2010
Sub-period (b): 4/23/2010 to 
7/31/2011
Sub-period (c): 8/1/2011 to 
6/30/2012
Sub-period (d): 7/1/2012 to 3/15/2013 Sub-period (e): 3/16/2013 to 1/27/2014                                    
Notes: We show the most important directional connections among the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond 
yields under study. Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in grayscale) 
correspond to the tenth, twentieth and thirtieth percentiles of all net pair-wise directional connections. Node size indicates sovereign debt market size. GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively.
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countries accounted for 75% of the total, and in the tenth and twentieth percentile all the 
receiver countries are peripheral (Greece, Ire-
land and Italy). Conversely, in the crisis period, the connectedness relationships account for 
59% of the total when peripheral countries 
are the triggers (in the tenth and twentieth percentile, only three relationships are de-tected departing from central countries), and although receivers are mostly peripheral, cen-
tral countries still account for 41% of the total.These results are very illuminating since they 
reinforce the idea that during the first ten years 
of currency union, investors’ risk aversion was very low since they overestimated the healing effect that economically sound central coun-tries  might have on the rest of the Eurozone. However, the situation radically changed with the advent of the crisis; suddenly, market par-ticipants focused their attention on the subs-tantial macroeconomic imbalances that some peripheral countries presented which not only would eventually lead them to default, but might also affect central countries that held important shares of the sovereign assets of 
those countries (the results suggest that both peripheral and central countries are net recei-vers of the connectedness relationships that mainly depart from peripheral countries).Moreover, the main conclusions that can be drawn from Figure 5b, which displays the evo-
lution of the net pair-wise directional connec-
tedness during the five crisis sub-periods, are the following. 
During sub-period (a), the period just before 
the beginning of the euro-area sovereign debt 
crisis (marked by Papandreou’s disclosure of 
Greece’s distressed public finances in Nov-
ember 2009), we not only detect a significant 
number (25) of net pair-wise relationships, 
but in 72% of the cases central countries are still the triggers. However, an important di-
fference with respect to the pre-crisis period is that peripheral countries carry less weight 
as receivers. In this sub-period, they account 
for 60% of the total, while the rest (40%) are central countries, showing that the effects of the crisis have clearly extended to the central countries. 
Nonetheless, the situation radically changes in 
sub-period (b), which includes the bail-outs of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In this phase not only does the number of connectedness rela-tionships decrease from 25 to 14, but their di-
rection changes as well. In this second sub-pe-
riod of the crisis, net pair-wise connectedness relationships mainly occur between peripheral 
countries, which have a weight of around 71% both as triggers and as receivers. Besides, it is worth noting that during this phase two cen-tral countries remain disconnected from the 
rest: the Netherlands and Finland. During sub-
period (c), which includes the support to the Spanish banking sector, Figure 3 shows that the total level of connectedness still registers a downturn trend; but although the number of 
connectedness relationships remains low (15), the amount detected in the tenth percentile 
clearly increases (up to 80%). Another signifi-cant development is the fact that central coun-tries recover their role in the relationships as 
both triggers and receivers (67% of the total). 
However, after Mario Draghi’s statement in 
July 2012 (sub-period d), a clear shift is obser-
ved. Now, net pair-wise relationships rise to 
33 (even more than in sub-period (a)) and not only is the role of central countries as triggers 
stressed (they represent 76% of the total), but peripheral countries also recover their role 
as receivers, returning to the level of the pre-
crisis period (64%). Finally, in the last sub-pe-
riod (which begins with the rescue of Cyprus), we again observe a decrease in the number of 
pair-wise connectedness relationships; howe-ver, the majority of them take place between 
peripheral countries, both as triggers (53% of 
the total) and as receivers (65%).
5. Concluding remarks.Our analysis, which has focused on the study of connectedness in EMU sovereign bond yields volatility during the period April 1999 to Ja-nuary 2014, may enhance the understanding 
of cross-market volatility dynamics in times of both turbulence and calm, and may help to as-sess the risk of crisis transmission. We stress 
the paper’s important methodological contri-bution: that is, the use of the ‘volatility surpri-
se’ component (along with other traditional 
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measures of volatility) to fully apprehend the 
sensitivity of financial markets to volatility shocks.The main contributions of our research can 
be summarized as follows. In the first step, we 
found a system-wide value of 54.23% for the total connectedness between the eleven cou-ntries under study for the full sample period. This level is much lower than that obtained by 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2014) for interna-
tional financial markets and US financial ins-titutions respectively. However, it should be understood in the context of the results obtai-ned in the second step, in which we analyse the dynamic nature of total net connectedness.In Figures 1 to 3, which plot total volatility connectedness, we clearly identify two distinct periods in its evolution which coincide with 
the evolution of 10-year yields. Indeed, the existence of these two different regimes in the evolution of connectedness has been empirica-
lly tested and corroborated. In the first period, the level of connectedness of EMU sovereign debt markets is very high, closely matching the 
evolution of 10-year yields. However, in the se-cond period, which begins only a few months 
before Papandreou’s government announced 
Greece’s distressed debt position (Novem-ber 2009), connectedness began a downturn 
trend. Consequently, the substantial decrease in the level of connectedness in EMU sovereign debt markets, along with the unfolding of the crisis, may explain its low average value in the static analysis for the whole sample period.In the third step, we calculated the net direc-tional connectedness index which provides 
information about how much each country’s sovereign bond yield volatility contributes 
in net terms to other countries’ sovereign bond yield volatilities. Our empirical eviden-ce shows that, for the whole sample, in three 
cases (the Netherlands, Finland and Portugal), 
their bond yield volatility influenced that of the rest of EMU countries, whereas the remai-ning countries are net receivers. The empirical evidence also suggests that during the stability period, the triggers of the net connectedness relationships are mainly central countries, but during the crisis, they are mostly peripheral countries.
In a further step, we used panel data techni-ques to analyse the drivers of net directional connectedness in each country. Our results once again highlight the differences between the two groups of EMU countries, central and peripheral. In net directional connectedness episodes triggered by peripheral countries, 
variables that gauge market participants’ per-ceptions seem to present a higher relevance, while macroeconomic fundamentals appear to play a greater role in relationships where central countries are the triggers. Moreover, without exception, all marginal effects register 
an increase in the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period.
Finally, in the last step we examined net pair-wise directional connectedness among the 11 EMU countries, both in the two regimes detec-
ted and during the five sub-periods in which 
the crisis period has been divided. Our fin-dings corroborate the conclusions drawn from the third step regarding the direction of net connectedness and provide further insights into both their intensity and their behaviour 
during the five sub-periods of the crisis.Overall, our results support the hypothesis that peripheral countries imported credibili-
ty from central countries during the first ten years of EMU. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the crisis ushered in a sudden shift in the sen-timent of market participants who now paid 
more attention to the significant macroeco-nomic imbalances in some of the peripheral countries and the possibility of contagion to central countries.To sum up, the analysis in this paper suggests that the sovereign risk premium increase in the euro area during the European sovereign debt crisis was not only due to deteriorated debt sustainability in member countries, but also to a shift in the origin of connectedness relationships which, as the crisis unfolded, mostly departed from peripheral countries. 
In this context, where cross-border financial activity was very important and market senti-ment indicators played a key role in explaining connectedness relationships triggered by peri-pheral countries, the risk that the default of the sovereign/banking sector in one of these cou-ntries might spread to other countries could 
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not be disregarded by financial authorities and policymakers with responsibility for ensuring 
financial stability.
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Appendix A: Definition of the explanatory variables to model net di-
rectional connectedness.
A.1. Variables that measure local macro-fundamentals.
Variable Description SourceNet position vis-à-visthe rest of the world(CAC) 
Current-account-balance-to-GDPMonthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly observations. OECD
Competitiveness(INF) Inflation rate. HICP monthly inter-annual rate of growth Eurostat
Fiscal Position(DEF and DEB) Government debt-to-GDP and Government deficit-to-GDP. Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly observations. Eurostat
Market liquidity(LIQ) Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector Amounts Outstanding (billions of US dollars)Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly observations. BIS Debt securities statis-tics. Table 18
A.2. Variables that measure local market sentiment.
Variable Description SourceStock Volatility(EVOL) Monthly standard deviation of the daily returns of each country’s stock market general index DatastreamConsumer
ConfidenceIndicator(CCI) This index is built up by the European Commission which conducts regular har-monised surveys to consumers in each country.
European Commission (DG ECFIN)
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